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poll numbers, fundraising data and campaign ads. watch the campaign trail friday night at 7:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. online at c-span.org or download on the podcast, our free mobile app or wherever you get your podcast. c-span, your unofficialed view of politics. >> coming up, a conversation about russia's development of a space based nuclear went with the secretary of state arms control mallory stewart hosted for strategic and international studies. this is about 45 minutes.

glad you are here on the friday afternoon. not that many people it show that is you're all very serious people. thank you for coming. my name is john hammory. i'm the president here at csis. i want to say a hearty welcome to all of you. we're in for a very unique opportunity. assistant secretary stewart is -- this doesn't normally happen when there's a breaking very serious development. development, we don't normally have the opportunity to hear from a senior policymaker in the state department or any place, to share with us the thinking of

the government about a big development. and this is a big development. we are really very fortunate. i don't know, it was a week ago, 10 days ago? jake sullivan in a press availability, made note that we think russia has put a nuclear device in orbit. now i mean, for 50 years, we have had what are called rtg's. these are power sources that are used to provide electricity for satellites. there is a nuclear court to those. but this is different. this is an implication that there is not a weapon in orbit or there could be a weapon in orbit and that is a very profound thing. first of all, it's a violation of international obligations.

but nuclear weapons in space are profoundly different from nuclear weapons here on planet earth. we are used to thinking about blast effects, they are the shockwaves, that sort of thing. all of that is the product of an earthly environment. but in space, nuclear detonation has no environment. to transform the energies. so it becomes x-rays that have astounding reach. it's a threat not to something that is five miles or 10 miles, is a threat to something that is 100 miles away. when we think of how space is becoming the ubiquitous platform for so many, both companies and countries, this is a profound threat. it really a serious issues.

so we are going to ask that today and i just want to say thank you to you, secretary stewart, for joining us today. it's a privilege to have you here. government employees working on the friday afternoon, not that many of us civilians work on a friday afternoon. clayton is working on a friday afternoon. clayton swope will run this meeting, over to you, clayton. thank you so much for coming. clayton: thank you for that introduction. again, my name is clayton swope, deputy director of aerospace security project here at csis. thank you, secretary for joining us today, coincidentally on international space today. i want to thank everyone here in person and online. as dr. john henry noted, space is an important part of our everyday lives, it plays an critical role in our economic security. as many of you may know, the aerospace security project produces an annual report on the

space threats and we are here today to discuss russia's development of an antinuclear satellite weapon which was one of the most concerning developments in our report released just two weeks ago. we have heard a lot of speculation based on a few confirmed details about what russia may be working on since february news. we know the u.s. is working with allies and partners, particularly at the u.n., and through the un security council resolution on this issue. to start off, could you tell us more about what the u.s. assesses that russia is developing, and how is the u.s. working on this threat? asst sec. stewart: thank you all. really happy to be here today. the united states is extremely concerned that russia may be considering the incorporation of nuclear weapons into its counterspace programs based on information we deem credible. the united states has been aware of russia's pursuit of this capability dating back years,

but only recently have we been able to make a more precise assessment of their progress. russia has publicly claimed that there satellite is for scientific purposes. however, the orbit is in the region not used by any other spacecraft that in itself was somewhat unusual, and the orbit is a region of higher radiation than normal lower-earth orbits. but not high enough of a radiation environment to allow accelerated testing of electronics, as russia has described the purpose to be. i also want to take a moment to consolidate here what we have said previously, just to remind you. what we want to clarify is that this is not an active capability that has already been deployed. although russia's pursuit of this capability is deeply troubling, there is no imminent

threat from that we aren't talking about a weapon that can be used to attack humans or cause structural damage on earth. instead, as assistant secretary said yesterday in his testimony, analysts assessed that a detonation in a particular placement in orbit of a magnitude and location would render low-earth orbit unusable for a certain amount of time. of course the broader issue here is that placement by states parties to the outer space treaty of a nuclear weapon in orbit is a clear violation of article four of the outer space treaty. and this is something that we have been discussing. we have been emphasizing and we have been trying to raise awareness of, we also, as clayton mentioned, pursued a

u.n. security council resolution to this effect, to try to strengthen the outer space treaty and try to reinforce state parties' commitment to article iv particularly because of the extraordinary risk to vital communications, scientific capacity, meteorological capacity, agricultural, commercial and of course, national security capabilities that satellites in this orbit would support and would be immediately eradicated by such violation. and the use of such a weapon. so, you asked what we are doing, and i am happy to talk about that. the president has directed a series of actions, specifically with search grave -- such a grave consequences to the international security and long-term sustainability of the outerspace environment. we decided to take this issue to the un security council. there is no other forum right

now in the international arena for the implementation of the outer space treaty. it is different from other arms-control treaties in that there isn't a body set up specifically to implement this treaty. given the grave consequences of a potential violation, we thought there should be a resolution reconfirming states parties' commitment to article iv. we took several steps. one is to consider un security council resolution and at the engage bilaterally with russia and with other countries, and as secretary blinken and i believe jake sullivan himself mentioned, we discussed this directly with china and with india. we have been discussing this with other countries that have a vested interest in the sustainability of the outerspace environment and at the u.n.. going to our u.n. proposal, the

u.s. and japan jointly proposed, and with ultimately 65 cosponsors in total, a u.n. security council resolution that reconfirmed the importance of the outer space treaty. , recommitted states parties to that treaty to abide by article iv preventing the orbit around the earth of nuclear weapons or other w.m.d.. that reaffirmed the importance of the peaceful uses and sustainable exploration and access to space and encouraged those member states of the u.s. and that word states parties to the outer space treaty to consider joining and supporting this. but also importantly, that called upon states to not develop any nuclear weapons or wmd for placement in outer.

so that went a step beyond, but it was a request calling upon countries to this. that outer space treaty is unique in that it prohibits the placement in orbit or around the earth of these weapons, but it does not talk about the development of the weapons as other arms-control treaties do in certain circumstances, so we thought that adding the effort to call upon states do not develop such weapons would be useful. we thought it was a very nonpolitical, evenhanded approach to remind the world and to reinforce the outer space treaty and its commitments. we took it forward with a total of 55 cosponsors to the un security council. as vetoed it. as was noted by our ambassador to the u.n., this is inconsistent with putin's statement that he intended not to place a nuclear weapon in outerspace. it raised questions, quite

frankly, as to why he felt the need to veto this un security council resolution, which also incorporated the idea of additional steps, point to that -- and i can talk about this in more detail if you want, points that both russia and china made. the idea of taking additional steps through either legally binding mechanisms or a not legally binding to reinforce, to support and to build upon the commitments in the outer space treaty to prevent an arms race in outerspace. our security council resolution work to prevent an arms race in outer space through these mechanisms where we can develop essentially credible and reliable means to verify such additional steps. we try to accommodate the comments we heard from many both on the u.s. security council --

un security council and amended the resolution doubling the number of preamble or paragraphs and adding substance to the operative paragraphs to reflect the comments we heard from it we engaged with both russia and china numerous times. we tried to incorporate those suggestions we could agree to, but russia in particular really relied upon their efforts to insist on additional parameters as they proposed an amendment to the resolution that was not agreed to. so again, next steps, on monday, may 6, there will be a discussion at the u because of russia's vetoed to talk about the circumstances for that veto and the u.n. security council context and we look forward to this as a conversation that brings in all members of the general assembly to hear their thoughts and understand their concerns on this issue. and then again, continuing to

engage bilaterally and multilaterally and to use other diplomatic tools in the context about were actually mentioned by both china and russia, but specifically russia in its explanation of their vote for the resolution. the you and first committee and other diplomatic forums in which these exact issues are being discussed. we hope to continue to have these conversations there. clayton: thank you for that information. and what the u.s. is doing and plans to do. looking at what language we have had specifically today from the u.s. government on this capability, it has been very precise. it has referred to this as a device, not a weapon. it has been couched in very specific terms. today just mentioned that one of the red flags with this capability was where it would be placed in orbit. could you unpack some of the statements to date on what that really means, and what would be

the effects on satellites, and why we should be concerned about it and how that precise language relates to the u.s. position today? asst sec. stewart: yes. we always have to be careful when we are talking about releaseable language and the context in which we are dealing with, intelligence operations and discussions. . there has been some carefully chosen language. i ended up reading more so i could make sure i got the language right, so i appreciate you letting me do that. what i think john plumb very effectively articulated in his testimony yesterday, what we are concerned about would potentially entail again, the limitation of lower-earth orbit for a certain amount of time for all settlers. the implication for any satellites in that orbital arena is such a weapon were placed in a certain magnitude in a certain location.

so i don't know that we know that much more about the potential consequence, it will depend on all the parameters are analysts are looking at and what ultimately is the placement and the magnitude. but there has been an evolution in our talking points to reflect growing concern on the issue and also to reflect the need for more information. and i think as we talk with other governments and hear their concerns and we hear at russian responses, we understand there is a need for as much information as possible so that we are not raising alarm bells without some explanation for why we feel this seriously about this potential threat. clayton: clayton: you clayton: mentioned engagement with other countries and also at the u.n., but outside of the. what is your biggest take away from u.s. efforts to discourage russia from pursuing this capability? are there any surprises,

particularly with how the vote flitted out at the u.n.? asst sec. stewart: thank you for that. we were surprised actually to be able to get to 65 cosponsors in a very short periods of time. we were heartened that it was one country vetoing in one country abstaining at the vote, so 13 countries agreeing with us that our resolution was important for national security, for international stability, security and long-term sustainability of outerspace and i think it reflect the seriousness with which governments are considering this issue that 13 governments agreed this was the responsible and appropriate approach. again, one country vetoing in one country abstaining. but i think it is really good to know that countries were able to see the potential threat so significantly and in such a short periods of time.

clayton: can he say anything publicly about how china looks at this issue? we have not heard them being very vocal about this. seems like they have such as dust -- just as many space equities of the united states, in some cases, and as much as a reason economically to want to preserve the use of space. how are they approaching this issue? asst. sec. stewart: i am certainly not going to speak for china, and i should be clear that we got a 13 countries on board, it is really to reinforce and support the outer space treaty and recognize the importance of the treaty, because ultimately, the first sort of approach to this is recommitting to an outer space treaty that for almost 60 years has provided the backbone of the sustainable legal architecture for the outerspace environment and for our use in long-term security of that arena. so, looking specifically to china's response and their explanation of the vote with

respect to their abstention, it seems they agreed in the importance of this -- they specifically said, we agree with the need to reinforce and to build upon the structure of the outer space treaty and they acknowledge and appreciate the prevention of an arms race in outerspace language, the idea in our u.n. security council resolution that the cd has also been discussing this issue and is the one buddy established for a legally binding mechanisms associated with the nonproliferation of this architecture. they abstained and then supported the russian amendment. so, again, i don't know what their internal thinking is, i can only comment on what they themselves have said and in their explanation of the vote, they said they supported the russian amendment. which, i should be clear, it specifically calls upon states

for all time to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space. and then talks about the prevention of force with the threat of force against space, from space to earth, or earth to space. this is a topic that has been actively discussed for many years in the disarmament context. we have two open-ended working groups coming up in the next several years to discuss more how we prevent an arms, and also how we get around are there politically binding or legally binding mechanisms to discuss this, how we solve the challenge of definition of what is an outer weapon in outerspace? then could one country use a peaceful satellite but with a nice purposes? how do you really encapsulate this? china said they wanted to incorporate that amendment. the challenge there is several.

that they are trying to sort of decide an issue that hasn't been decided even though it has been debated quite openly and assertively in other contexts for many years. several examples. in the cd, we have had an open- ended working group, a conversation about the placement of weapons in our space to that russia and china support. the challenge in that context is it defines weapons in outerspace -- it doesn't define them. it says, we are prohibiting weapons in outer space. without the definition of "weapon." the concern for many countries is what about those earth-based weapons that can be used against satellites in space? we have seen president putin himself talk about his space laser in 2018 and 2019, and their deputy foreign minister ryabkov talk about a subsequent laser that was used both in ukraine, and had the capacity to

dazzle satellites in 1500 kilometers in orbit around the earth. so they have talked about earth-based anti-sunlight capacity for some time. the concern was if you are talking about venting weapons in outerspace but you aren't covering a whole category, and there is description about how that would play out, what you're trying to do and how that would be implemented and verified in the absence of definitions and the absence of covering an entire range. threat of use of force in space is a weird thing to limit given that that is something the u.n. charter itself discusses. it's a lot of debate. sorry to take you in the deep dive into specifics. we didn't want the amendment russia proposed to decide this issue which is being actively debated. we specifically limited our resolution to that very clear

cut support for the outer space treaty and the obligations of states parties to that pretty to limit it from some of the political debates, from the ongoing political debates and to not decide for countries something they haven't already agreed upon. that is what we saw the amendment doing. that is what china supported in its explanation of their vote. china also referenced a previous resolution, 7821, in which they talked about preventing the placement of weapons in outer space, the same exact weapons. but 50 countries disagreed with that resolution. it didn't present consensus. there was a significant debate as to what that meant in the context of numerous different bays and birth capabilities. so, again, trying to limit the security council resolution to the specific implementation of the outer space treaty, article iv, and to remind a worldwide why this was so important versus taking down an issue that hasn't been decided and should be decided and should continue to

be discussed -- and we encourage that -- in the context of working groups. in the first committee, as those discussions come up, and in other venues in which of these issues are being actively discussed and debated. clayton: i think you raise a very interesting point about the amendment based on the prevention of placement of weapons in space which arguably goes beyond what the u.s. and japan was asking for in the resolution. how does russia justify that position on that particular text, and then not supporting the u.s. and japanese u.s. -- u.n. security council resolution? asst. sec. stewart: i can only speak from their justifications and their explanation of the vote. i suspect we will hear more on may six. their justification essentially is they don't want to agree 2 in 4 enforce article iv specifically without incorporating this broader issue

of preventing all the placement of orphans in outerspace. that challenge for us is that we have presented a resolution that would help strengthen the outer space treaty, encourage others to join the commitment, then prevent states --: states to prevent the development of these kinds of weapons to place in orbit around the earth. we think that goes as far as it can on issues that can collectively be agreed upon. because it is talking about states parties to the outer space treaty adhering to this and calling upon other countries to take these additional steps. limiting it to space-based weapons. but not defining what weapon means. and then also talking about use of force or the threat of use of force. in other countries have not agreed to the formulation and nor it does not formulation explain how russia can continue

to threaten to use land-based weapons against satellites in space, which they have done recently. i will highlight your mention of them threat-based assessment report. it reflects the challenge and difficulty and complication of all these issues given other countries' work on the space weapons and the potential definition of challenges with respect to these two issues. clayton: that's nice of you to say. i am happy to plug the report. we are glad it means something to you too. i want to mention really quickly that we are taking questions from the audience. please free to -- please feel free to scan the qr code or go to our webpage to submit them that way. i want to think about how this fits in the context of russia's behaviors on arms control in general, or maybe this information from russia on issues related to arms control. do you think there is a pattern with space-related activities in

this resolution that looks like how they broadly behave on arms control issues? asst. sec. stewart: i think all of us have been tracking that the russian federation has walked away from numerous, if not all of the existing arms control and nonproliferation architectures to some degree. certainly the legal suspension of the new start treaty in light of its ongoing illegal invasion of the ukraine, it reflects its desire to place its personal ambition about international law. i think we have also seen that in their withdrawal from the cfv . in them challenging international architectures such as the chemical weapons invention, and the use of chemical weapons, and the broad based sort of effort to delay

and challenge numerous architectures that are existing in the international arena. in this context, what i find most fascinating is that we see in the space a reflection of some patterns they have taken elsewhere which is to threaten, as we have seen recently with a russian governmental official, those space capabilities which support ukraine, threatened that they may be targeted by the russian government from supporting ukraine. so, utilizing threats against race-based capabilities, and also proudly talk about their laser systems from the-based, asat capabilities. and at the same the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space treaty. in no way that seems inconsistent, again, preventing

use of force in a manner that seems inconsistent with their activities. if the pattern we have seen. they have used chemical weapons continuing against navalny and the skripals. and the allegation that was recently made and continues to be investigated about their use of a schedule iii nuclear weapon in ukraine. it's a challenge we have seen across the board, actions inconsistent with the international architecture. it seems like a pattern and we should just be careful to try to prevent their effect information narratives from continuing to degrade the international architectures we rely upon for our security and for the security of the global community. clayton: we can move to a couple of questions from the audience, if that's all right. i have one from julian bond's,

from the new york times. how close is russia to deploying their nuclear weapon and what should the response to such a deployment be? asst. sec. stewart: i don't have an answer for that, for how close they are to deploying. i think the more important question is how we can work to prevent that and i think everything we are doing in the diplomatic arena is working to prevent the russians from going forward with this program and i think the international response should be outrage if this actually goes forward because it affects everyone. every single country. it is indiscriminate in its potential effects. of it is much different than efforts to hold the risk limited to just the u.s. and our partners and allies, it would affect everyone including china and india and russia own satellites. it is extraordinarily destabilizing and the international community needs to reflect that concern.

clayton: may be a follow on to that, if we are looking at ways to stop russia from this development, does it make sense to look at a like this in terms of an arms-control agreement? does it make sense to approach that a different way? security council is not necessarily a place where arms-control happens. is there a new approach needed here because it is so different or does it look a lot like a typical arms-control effort from the u.s. perspective? asst. sec. stewart: in the u.n. security council resolution context, we try to reaffirm and recommit to the existing that keep the global community space, but in our resolution, we proposed to work towards either politically binding or legally binding mechanisms to further prevent an arms race in outerspace and work towards some credible way to verify these types of commitments. i think what we need to figure

out in implementing the outer space treaty is how we can develop a capability to credibly establish that russia is no longer pursuing this program. that is a really hard thing to do. it's not something that -- if anything that we can come up with on our own would be lately agreed to with russia. i think you have seen in previous contexts where syria had denied his chemical weapons program for a long time until basically the u.s. and russia works together to bring syria into the chemical weapons convention and then worked to destroy a program it had denied historically, we will have to think of creative ideas to figure out how to credibly believe that russia is not pursuing this program and how to feel confident that this is not a risk that the world has to continue to focus on. clayton: and i have a question here from neal wolf that mcgill

university. it relates on the international effort to push back on what russia is doing. it's about japan's participation in the resolution. does japan's participation in the u.n. resolution reflects japan's existing or possibly growing role in the iss, particularly in light of russia's decreasing iss involvement, or is there another reason japan would be interested in this topic? asst. sec. stewart: japan has been a close partner it with the united states government in space security, in the sustainability of outerspace. japan has deeply supported all of the efforts the international community has taken to ensure the long-term sustainability of outerspace and the japanese space program is doing amazing things to continue to develop and incorporate greater scientific capacity and

improvement of capabilities. japan was a natural partner, in fact, really did a good job in explaining why this should matter to all governments, not just the u.s. and japan, but all governments that have a present or future reliance on outerspace. i think eventually that will be all governments. so japan was a natural partner for this and we deeply appreciate their pushing us forward. clayton: this is kind of a similar question about the impacts. is there an impact with iss, but impacts with just human space activities? this is from a professor at the city university of new york. do you see a direct effect on the international space station operations, i will also add in china's space station as well as international scientific operations in lower-earth orbit or beyond, it in the space telescope missions or space

exploration missions? is there a broader impact of these types of activities that aren't really national security focused? it really focused on that human aspect. how does this relate to those activities? asst. sec. stewart: right. so this capability is not presently in orbit. however, i think the concern is that it would potentially impact all of the scientific, commercial, communications, agriculture, neurological, all capacities in space could potentially be impacted by such a program if it goes forward to the actual placement in violation of the outer space treaty. those are impacts that would depend on the magnitude and the location. but that is something that we should all be concerned about. clayton: there is another question along this thread, this one is from vox, how would

this impact corporation, what there is left post-ukraine, between ngassa and roscosmos on iss? does it have the potential to impact what is left from that space corporation in the civil domain i think it is important that we continue as much cooperation as possible. i think working toward a situation in which we can credibly confirm nothing is going forward that would violate the outer space treaty would be important. but having alerted the international community to this concern, having taken it seriously and addressed it in the u.n. security council resolution, we will continue to push russia to work with us on this. but i don't think -- the fact that we are working towards credibly confirming that this is not a program that will continue, should necessarily require no cooperation whatsoever. but as you pointed out, it is very limited right now, but i

don't think the existing capacity to cooperate should necessarily be diminished even further while we try to figure out how russia credibly demonstrates that it is not pursuing this capability. clayton: and we have talked -- we have a few questions about the international space station, civil efforts in space exploration. one thing i was wondering, how does a capability like this may be cause us to rethink our space architecture? talking about proliferated constellations in lower-earth orbit -- is this a way to put those at risk, in your mind, or is this a different goal when russia is trying to deploy this capability? i know that we might not know, but just looking at how the u.s. government looks at why russia would be doing this, does this mean how we should -- does this

mean we should rethink how we think about our space architectures? asst. sec. stewart: that is a good question. if there is a lot of things russia seems to be doing to potentially have leverage for to hold the u.s. government capacities at risk. in this context, i would do for you to the department of defense and test space force's space command as to how we can more effectively respond or address. i think we are doing a lot already to address some of the challenges we have in space when you talk about these really diversified responsive architectures. they are already efforts that we are taking to address some of the space challenges, but certainly, with respect to how we change or how we evolve or even what we do to be more responsive and to defend against this, i would refer you to the department of defense. clayton: maybe we will do one more question from the audience here and then start to rap. asst. sec. stewart: ok.

clayton: this is from "popular mechanics," as part of an effort in transparency and to urge russia, is the u.s. prepared to release more information about its own developing counterspace capabilities? asst. sec. stewart: it's an interesting questions because it assumes capacities that may or may not exist. certainly the u.s. has tried to be transferred as possible with regard to space programs, explaining even in the face of narratives that some of our capacities are weaponized, where they are not. i would refer you to some good communications about what we are doing in space, the clarification and transparency being provided both by the space force and by space command and our department of defense colleagues. i think they have tried to address the allegations and tried to demonstrate what

actually we are doing in space. i think there are those who can answer the question better than i can. i am thinking historically back when some of our extraordinarily nasa-related peaceful scientific efforts were accused of being weapons. we are subjected to allegations of the time and we try to be as transparent as possible as to the purpose of our programs. clayton: maybe it's a question to end on, just looking forward, you can see two paths. this is something that russia develops and deploys. are there concerns that china could want one next, or this could be a capability that would be proliferating in orbit, more than just russia wanting this capability? that is one vision. and i guess the question would be, how could we stop that? what are the next steps really that the u.s. is looking for? is that happening at the u.n.,

behind the scenes? realizing that there is no silver bullet do you think a scenario like that could happen? and what is, in your mind, the best way that the u.s. should be trying to prevent that? asst. sec. stewart: i will use the opportunity to talk about the space threat assessment report. we have seen the development in the sort of capacities to jam or dazzle or blind. the fact that russia has been bragging about its laser capabilities is normalizing that capacity. we have heard allegations of gps-jamming around kaliningrad that could potentially impact airlines and the safety of air travel. these kinds of things shouldn't be normalized, but you are right to point out that if we don't prevent them, try to demonstrate them as deviant from what is the responsible approach, what is consistent with international law, we risk other governments following potentially that path.

we have seen this in numerous arenas in the arms control context, right, think about chemical weapons and how serious's repeated use of -- syria's repeated use of chemical of this has led to the greater potential use by nonstate actors and continued use by other governments in ways that demonstrates less and less upholding of the norm. so it is a context in which arms-control often has to a permit to and reestablish the importance of international law to prevent the actors but also illegal activity. the concern is always that if this is allowed to proceed and become something that gives russia and the advantage, it is hard to prevent other governments from doing the same thing with international dance hopefully as that reminder of something that we all collectively negotiated because it is in our collective interest

-- russia, u.s., china, everyone's interest, to prevent these types of destabilizing capacities. that is why we have been working very hard, to figure out how we can continue to enforce and uphold the outer space treaty. clayton: that is a great way to end this, the outer space treaty from 1967, a lot of the motivators back then, the same one to drive us today, looking at a sustainable, peaceful environment is the single. sound like it underpins a lot of your efforts to do and how you are approaching this. asst. sec. stewart: absolutely. clayton: we are on time. thank you, secretary seward. thank you for your support of csis generally particularly your work on nuclear issues led by heather williams. thank you everyone for joining us today here and on line for it have a good weekend, and may the force be with you. [laughter] [applause] -- may the fourth be with you.

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